Friday, October 2, 2015

Were Nietzsche and Kierkegaard think buddies ?

       While watching the lectures concerning Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Birth of Tragedy, I couldn’t help going back to Kierkegaard’s philosophy and the way it intertwines with Nietzsche’s. Indeed, it feels like Kierkegaard’s research for the Self through the aesthetic, ethic and religious personalities, and Nietzsche’s frenzy to unearth Truth are strangely alike. They both see existence as a notion that cannot be fully grasped; it is a subjective and therefore unseizable truth for Kierkegaard and a well-designed ensemble of illusions that covers up the real Truth with a « veil of forgetfulness » for Nietzsche. 

Yet, they both seek this True existence, through the authentic life with Kierkegaard, the aim of which is to avoid the temptation of the absurd, and through the destruction of illusions, that is to say of metaphysics with Nietzsche. Therefore the idea of the absurd and of metaphysics resemble each other; they’re dreamlike and pleasant illusions that humans run to so that they can go on living pleasantly without pondering and trembling over the ultimate and only Truth that is they are going to die. For both philosophers, the discovery of « real » existence involves a violent and cruel tearing apart of one’s self, an exhausting internal turmoil. It can only be achieved through rigorous self-introspection for Kierkegaard and through the utter destruction of all values for Nietzsche.


And yet, Nietzsche is such an optimistic guy compared to Kierkegaard ! Indeed, whereas Kierkegaard can never find the Self (it could never be defined in the first place anyway so it was kind of a lost cause from the beginning) and is left with trembling and utmost despair, Nietzsche thinks that man finally done with « the dragon » is left with the endless possibility of childhood. In the latter’s opinion, the nothingness of nihilism does not mean the annihilation of the hope to discover the « True » world. On the contrary, it symbolizes the literal rebirth of mankind that rediscovers sensuous existence and can create and ingenuously play with its rules, not having yet forgotten the way metaphors work. 

Nietzsche is firm with the certainty that destruction of morality means renewal. He is not left, like Kierkegaard, with the despairing view that only doubt remains when the absurd goes. Whereas he follows his idea that tragic poetry is perfect, and therefore that staring into the abyss of death, that is to say to glimpse at Truth, is an inevitable step towards the liberation of mankind, Kierkegaard cannot help but fall into the abyss when looking into it, and his numerous attempts to find the Self become a way into the absurd, escaping the terrifying Truth that has been revealed, and these attempts fail, of course, as he realizes he’s fallen into the most abstract absurdity. Kierkegaard is then left with the only comfort of despair, as it is the last abstraction left before death. 





And through the acceptation of our own death, that is the only Truth ever achievable, Nietzsche defeats Kierkegaard. Man is freed form the absurd, it has accepted and embraced its Truth and has freed himself from the carcans of religion, morals and even of reason. Amor Fati is the only path to cheerfulness, to this new era that characterizes the Übermensch, to existence.


Hum, but isn’t it a little more complicated than that ? 

I cannot help but be skeptical about Nietzsche’s Übermensch. If we destroy metaphysics and get into a stage where new meaning is to be invented, doesn’t it involve that eventually, we will be back to metaphysics, with different values and different over and devaluation of these values, but with metaphysics nevertheless ? Isn’t building new meaning creating a new illusion, another small truth that will eventually be transformed into a metaphor, into a veil of forgetfulness  that will get us back at stage one ?



What Nietzsche truly condemns is the devaluation of life though metaphysics. Yet the act of rediscovering Truth, of reasserting life through the acceptance of death in a Dionysian perspective, is in itself the construction of a new metaphysical world in which two values, life and death, oppose each other isn’t it ? 

As with Kierkegaard’s philosophy, we’re then left with the idea that the search for the Self or for a new order liberated from metaphysics is a mere illusion, and maybe the greatest of them all ! Therefore don’t we find ourselves back to Kierkegaard’s absolute uncertainty except in death, the latter which actually stands for ultimate doubt and for the greatest unknown ?




And yet, and I’d like to finish on that, isn’t ultimate doubt what Nietzsche relishes most ? He fully acknowledges the fact that he doesn’t have a clue how the world will look after metaphysics has been destroyed. Even if it is only a step of an eternal cycle, what does it matter if it means the new metaphysical world is completely different from the precedent one and can be destroyed at anytime so that rebirth can happen again ? The Eternal Return of the Same here takes on all its meaning; it is no burden as humans do not perceive it as such, and  as it is never quite the same as they are never fully conscious of it. Here, the Übermensch has been achieved ! Humans endlessly play with this eternal rebirth of metaphysics, invent new rules and destroy them as time goes by, living through endlessly different combinations of overvalued and devalued moral systems. 

Whereas uncertainty is despair for Kierkegaard, it is pure cheerfulness for Nietzsche ! The two philosophers are then the two faces of the same coin ! They are fear and joy over doubt. 




3 comments:


  1. Thank you for this very interesting post, I like how you point out both the similarities and also the differences between both philosophers. And you clarify Nietzsche’s concept of metaphysics :)

    But I think there is one crucial point you didn’t clearly mention. The role of religion in both of the theories. They both agree that the present form of Christianity can be criticized, and that the attempts to rationalize faith were ineffective. But whereas Kierkegaard states that Christianity is an important step toward subjectivity, Nietzsche criticizes the weakness of religion, the destruction of metaphysics inducing the death of God. To him, the destruction of God leads to cheerfulness.
    But can you therefore state that uncertainty is despair for Kierkegaard, and pure cheerfulness for Nietzsche?

    To me, if I’m not mistaken, Kierkegaard are not the face of fear over doubt. It is more the face of courage over doubt. There is no rational decision in faith, but you have to make an irrational leap to be released from doubts. Whereas for Nietzsche it is the acceptance of fate that leads to cheerfulness.

    So wouldn’t your last sentence should be the following? The two philosophers are the two faces of the same coin: they are overcoming and resignation with regard to uncertainty.

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  2. Hey Anastasia. Thanks a lot for your comment, it helped me think through theses questions further !

    I'd first like to react on your reading of Nietzsche's philosophy, in regard to religion and what you call resignation over uncertainty. I don’t think I agree with you saying that Nietzsche considers religion as being weak. On the contrary, I think he points out the strength of the metaphysical system religion has achieved to build. Indeed, it is so strongly enshrined into mentalities that Truth has been hidden and veiled, and that religious metaphysical illusional truths are being confused for it. Nietzsche himself fully acknowledges the fact that he cannot completely detach himself from this dual system of thinking, and that he cannot imagine the form the world will take when the Übermensch finally prevails. Therefore, religion is everything but weak !

    On your other point concerning resignation over uncertainty, I do agree with you. Nietzsche is resignation over doubt. Yet it is no passive resignation, and I think I’d rather have used the word acceptance, for it doesn’t have a negative pang to it. For Nietzsche’s Amor Fati, if it needs be called submission to death, is submission to Truth only, and is rather a liberation than an alienation. It is liberation from God and metaphysics. In my opinion, it is relishing this newly acquired freedom though it requires acceptance of doubt and uncertainty. It is acceptance not to take anything for granted but your own death. Therefore, resignation (or acceptance, however we choose to call it) over uncertainty, also means cheerfulness over doubt. It is the ecstatic joy of being liberated from the crushing force of metaphysics and of being certain that the only certainty is death. It is utter liberation.

    Second of all, I’d like to come back on your comment over Kierkegaard being the overcoming of doubt. I’m afraid I do not totally agree on this either, although your point makes real sense ! It is true, I think, that the leap of faith is the overcoming of doubt, or rather, its suspension, as it involves the suspension of all reasoning and questioning. Yet, it is no viable state, and Kierkegaard, in an outcry, admits that he can never fully comprehend Abraham and that this Leap of Faith actually corresponds to the greatest form of absurdity, to the greatest illusion and to the utter alienation of one’s self. Therefore, after getting through the three different stages (aesthetic, ethical and religious) of research of the self, Kierkegaard discovers it cannot be found, and that the only thing that remains is doubt, that no human being ought to be striped from, because the only thing left aside from it is death. So I don’t think Kierkegaard ever overcomes uncertainty, but rather that he despairs over it, yet can never get rid of that despair.

    So I think we can say that Nietzsche is resignation over uncertainty (although I’d rather use acceptance), that actually corresponds to cheerfulness over uncertainty. But I wouldn’t say Kierkegaard is the overcoming of uncertainty, although you’re right when stating that Kierkegaard’s Leap of Faith corresponds to the overcoming of doubt.

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  3. What I wanted to focus on was point out is the following point: to Nietzsche detaching from religion gives us the possibility to become a self, to become an Übermensch, but to Kierkegaard we need religion to become a self; we have to make the leap of faith, a movement from the rational to the irrational.

    I agree resignation was a badly chosen word. Nothing is further from my intention then to consider Nietzsche as weak, His nihilism is not at all a destructive one but a constructive. The overman, while detaching from religion and former morals, will lead to a reversment of morality.

    And there comes the problem of a possible grasping of truth. We both agree that facing the uncertainty, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard will have a reaction, either overcoming or acceptance (to use your word) of uncertainty.
    But I’m asking myself the following question. Doesn’t they both find a way to destroy the uncertainty?

    As I understood the arrival of the Übermensch, will not lead to a new morality, but back to the morality before Plato. And this is described in the Birth of Tragedy. Now, correct me if I’m mistaken, the perfect mix of Apollonian and Dionysian, leads to tragedy. And the tragic place shows the brutality of existence, and to face with the truth of nature: we are going to die. We can thus encounter the truth of existence .

    You say, “But I wouldn’t say Kierkegaard is the overcoming of uncertainty, although you’re right when stating that Kierkegaard’s Leap of Faith corresponds to the overcoming of doubt.”. I am not sure to grasp the difference you make between uncertainty and doubt.
    With overcoming of uncertainty I mean that Kierkekaargd doesn’t try to find a rational truth, but admit that there is an irrational one. Isn’t his book entitled subjectivety is truth?

    Thus shouldn’t we say that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are destroying uncertainty by finding a path to truth?

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